In this paper, we analyze a zero-knowledge identification scheme presented in [1], which is based on an average-case hard problem, called distributional matrix representability problem. On the contrary to the soundness property claimed in [1], we show that a simple impersonation attack is feasible.
Introduction
Zero-knowledge proof is an interactive method for one party to convince another of knowledge of a secret without revealing any information on the secret. It has been used in authentication systems where a prover wants to prove her identity to a verifier via some secret information, but does not want the verifier or a wiretapper to learn anything about the secret. The zeroknowledge proof must satisfy completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge property. Completeness is satisfied if an honest verifier always verifies an honest prover. Soundness is satisfied if no cheating prover can convince an honest verifier of knowledge of the secret. Zero-knowledge property stipulates that no cheating verifier learns any information on the secret except the fact that the prover knows the secret. Zero-knowledge proofs was introduced in the seminal paper of Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [3] and realized as Fiat-Shamir scheme and Schnorr's scheme [2, 6] . They are based on well known problems in number theory such like integer factoring problem and discrete logarithm problem. Since there are no proofs on the hardness of these problems, cryptographers have published alternative schemes based on NP-complete problems in combinatorics, coding theory, graph theory, and so on.
NP-complete problems are widely used as basis of cryptographic protocols. However, most of NP-complete problems allow for efficient solvers on random instances, making useless their worst-case difficulty. For this reason, Levin et al. introduced a notion of average-case complexity which deals with distributional problems assuming that instances are chosen from a certain distribution [5] . A pair of a decision problem and a distribution of instances is called a distributional NP problem, if some non-deterministic polynomial time algorithm solves the problem on random instances chosen from the distribution. A distributional NP-complete problem is similarly defined. It can be regarded as analogous to an NP-complete problem in worst-case analysis.
In [1] , the author presented a new identification scheme based on the hardness of distributional matrix representability problem, which is known to be distributional NP-complete, and claimed that the success probability of impersonating an honest prover is not greater than 2 −m , where m is the number of rounds in a session. However, in this paper, we show that a simple impersonation attack is feasible with success probability almost one! Our attack suggests that the security proof of the identification scheme is flawed. In the next section, we briefly review the scheme and the underlying problem. In Section 3, our impersonation attack is illustrated with a toy example.
2. Caballero-Gil's identification scheme
Underlying problem
A distributional decision problem is a pair of a decision problem and a probability distribution of instances. In the matrix representability problem with security parameters r and k, an instance consists of a square integral matrix M of order r, a set P = {M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M k } of k distinct square integral matrices of order r, and a positive integer n. Each instance is chosen uniformly at random. The problem is to decide if matrix M can be represented as a product of n matrices in P. For r = 20, the matrix representability problem has been proved as distributional NP-complete [7] . (So we assume r = 20 throughout this paper.) Now the Caballero-Gil's identification scheme is based on the search version of the matrix representability problem.
Identification scheme
Caballero-Gil's identification scheme involves two parties: a prover Alice and a verifier Bob. That is, Alice wants to prove herself to Bob. In the preparation steps, Trusted Authority(TA) generates and publishes a set P = {M 1 , . . . , M k } of k invertible r × r matrices of integer entries. (The set P is commonly used for every user in the system.) Then Alice chooses a private (ordered) subset
and computes her public information M A = n j=1 M i j , where n is a system parameter. Now each session of Caballero-Gil's scheme consists of m rounds, and each round is executed as follows. Note that integers m and t in the following description are system parameters.
(1) (Commit) Alice chooses an integral vector v of size r and an integer x between 2 and 2 n uniformly at random, and sends Bob 2k witness
..,k in a random order and a witness integer
(2) (Challenge) Bob randomly selects a bit e ∈ {0, 1}, and depending on its value, requests to Alice: (a) (Decommit) vector v and integer 
Impersonation attack
The soundness of this scheme depends on the difficulty of finding matrices M
v without knowing the private subset P A . However, one can generate valid responses without knowledge of P A .
Attack scenario
In order for an adversary Oscar to impersonate Alice to Bob, Oscar does the followings for each round.
(1) (Commit) Oscar randomly chooses an integral vector v of size r, an integer x between 2 and 2 n and a set of indices {i 1 , . . . , i n } from {1, . . . , k}. Then Oscar sends Bob 2k witness vectors {M
..,k in any order and a witness integer v T M A x v. Note that Oscar is able to compute the witness vectors and the witness integer from public information P and M A . (2) (Challenge) Bob randomly selects a bit e ∈ {0, 1}, and depending on its value, requests to Oscar: (a) (Decommit) vector v and integer 
Finding the matrix H 1
The success probability of our attack depends on Oscar's ability to find a matrix H 1 satisfying equality (1). Simplifying notations, we want to find an r × r integral matrix H satisfying u T Hw = y for a given integer y and given integral vectors u and w. As an additional condition, we require that H is invertible and its determinant is divided by the determinant of M A since otherwise Bob would be able to check if the matrix H is faithfully computed. However, we note that this step is not specified in the original description of the scheme.
Let H = (h ij ), u = (u 1 , . . . , u r ) and w = (w 1 , . . . , w r ). Then a simple computation shows
For simplicity, we will find h ij satisfying the following conditions.
(
Then, equation (3) is rewritten as follows.
Since we know u, w, and M A , equation (4) is simplified as
By re-indexing the coefficients and the variables, we see that finding an integer solution to equation (5) is equivalent to finding an integer solution ( x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t ) to an equation of the following form,
where every coefficient is integral and t = r(r−1) 2
. If there exists i * ∈ {1, . . . , t} such that a i * = 0 divides Y , then x i * = Y /a i * and x i = 0 for i = i * would be a trivial solution to (6) . Also, if there exists a co-prime pair (a i , a j ), then we would be able to find an integer solution by the extended Euclidean algorithm. In general, a condition for equation (6) to have integer solutions can be derived from Bézout's identity.
Lemma 3.1 ((Bézout's identity) [4]). If a and b are nonzero integers with the greatest common divisor d, then there exist integers x and y such that
Moreover, for any integers a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n with the greatest common divisor g, there exist integers x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n such that
Since the integers satisfying (8) can be found by iteratively applying the extended Euclidean algorithm, Bézout's identity implies that we could solve equation (6) if gcd(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t ) = 1. Now we estimate the probability P that gcd (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t ) = 1 under the assumption that the coefficients a i 's are distributed uniformly at random within the interval [ 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t }, we obtain the following inequality.
A straightforward computation shows = 190, and the probability P that equation (6) has a solution is estimated by P ≥ 1 − 1/189 ≈ 0.9947.
Example
In this section, we illustrate our impersonation attack for the first round of the scheme with a small example. Let
and 
